Can the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) build on their momentum to transform the international order, or will they be remembered as a geopolitical fad? To assess the prospects of the figurehead for emerging power aspirations, international relations scholarship has focussed on three lines of inquiry: Is an investment label a useful category for political analysis? Can such diverse states really cooperate? And which ones are most likely to challenge the liberal world order? This paper follows an alternative path: instead of emphasizing the BRICS' differences, it examines the associational dynamics and practices that inform their collective journey. Drawing on the rationalist literature on bargaining coalitions and on the constructivist literature on 'imagined' communities, we develop an analytical framework to investigate whether states exploit their BRICS affiliation tactically, to rise in tandem, or strategically, to rise together. Out two case studies, which examine BRICS efforts to curb Washington's 'exorbitant privilege', and to develop a collective response to the climate crisis, respectively, suggest that even when the BRICS share soft revisionist goals, coalitional cohesion and community formation are tentative at best. In the absence of clear common objectives, the BRICS abandon all but the rhetoric of coalitional behaviour. We conclude that unless the five emerging powers agree on a coherent strategy to harness their relative strengths, the BRICS' geopolitical play will be defeated by their own tactical ploys.
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Introduction
The West's fiscal woes and protracted controversies over adjustments, reforms and rescues have reinforced hopes, and fears about the 'inevitable' rise of rest. But can emerging power alignments like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) really build on their economic momentum to transform international relations, or will they be remembered as a geopolitical fad?
Supporters of the developing world's most coveted club have reason to be optimistic. Growth may be slowing in China, and Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa face huge structural challenges. Yet according to IMF estimates, the BRICS share of global GDP will still surpass that of the G7 around 2020, at least at purchase power parity (IMF 2012) . At their April 2011 Summit in Hainan, moreover, BRICS leaders announced that they had reached a 'broad consensus' to improve coordination and strengthen cooperation 'on international and regional issues of common interest.' In a bid to move beyond the perfect communiqué, they also identified 14 cooperation programmes that would be enhanced, four new initiatives to be launched and five areas that might lead to future cooperation (BRICS 2011). According to the some estimates, BRICS members complied with three quarters of their Hainan commitments, on average (BRICS Research Group 2012). The Libyan and Syrian crises also gave them ample scope to test whether their 'concurrent presence' in the Security Council would help them to find common ground 'on issues of peace and security, to strengthen multilateral approaches and to facilitate future coordination' (BRICS 2011) . To the surprise of many, the BRICS took a common stance on Libya, and to the dismay of most, Russian and Chinese vetoes have been backed by Brazilian, Indian and South African abstentions. The new sense of BRICS cohesion also altered the topography of other multilateral arenas. At a December 2011 ministerial in Geneva, BRICS trade ministers agreed on common principles in WTO negotiations (Baracuhy 2012) . At the 2012 Delhi Summit, they unveiled plans to create a BRICSled South-South Development Bank (BRICS 2012).
Nevertheless, doubts about the BRICS' political prospects persist. The 'original' BRIC's decision to underwrite a banker's wager may have muted debates about the analytical value of an investment label (Armijo 2007) . But few observers believe that well-choreographed encounters, handpicked initiatives or lofty plans mean that diverse and potentially antagonistic states are either willing or able to translate their combined economic prowess into collective geopolitical clout. In international negotiations, BRICS delegations rely on distinct negotiation styles and repertories (Narlikar 2010) . In contentious UN votes, they are as likely to agree or disagree as they were before their political inception (EP 2011) . Alongside the BRICS, members maintain a range of more or less congruent arrangements, such as 'regional' Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the 'democratic' IBSA or the 'all but Russia' BASIC group (Hurrell 2010) .
Despite burgeoning commercial and diplomatic ties, moreover, the nuclear 'big three' -Russia, India and China -continue to compete for central Asian influence and resources. Moscow and Beijing reportedly clashed over BRICS enlargement, and commentators fret that Russia's failure to live up to its great power ambitions in the Asia-Pacific might derail the Sino-Russian rapprochement (Blank 2011) .
At the policy level, the spectre of a cohesive BRICS alignment has prompted experts and advisors to highlight the members' differences and to encourage Western governments to selectively engage with countries that 'do not form a bloc and should thus not be approached ... as a coherent bloc' (EP 2011:32) . As reassuring as such a policy stance may appear to the paragons of the status quo, a divide et impera approach has a number of drawbacks. First, it ignores that the BRICS have been rising in tandem. Bloc or not, even the U.S. Secretary of Defence reckons that emerging powers 'like China and Brazil and India, not to mention obviously Russia ... provide a challenge to us not only in trying to cooperate with them, but making sure that they don't undermine the stability of the world.' 2 Second, divide et impera discounts the BRICS' potential to overcome strategic rivalries to rise together. Just like Britain, Germany and France buried their hatches to unify Europe, however awkwardly and against a backdrop of U.S. carrots and Soviet sticks, Russia, India and China may find that they share a common destiny after all.
Finally, divide et impera assumes that the BRICS are in it for individual gains rather than the 'more equitable and fair' global order of summit lore.
To address these tensions, this study re-examines the BRICS trajectory in light of the associational dynamics and practices that inform and underpin agency in international relations. It argues that the BRICS' prospects and impact hinge not just on their ability to reconcile different endowments and aspirations, but on the spice and romance their interactions add -or don't add -to their unlikely engagement. To explain how the BRICS affiliation affects member conduct , we develop an analytical framework that draws on the rationalist literature on bargaining coalitions and on the constructivist literature on 'imagined' international communities. To establish whether member states 'merely' exploit their BRICS membership to rise 'in tandem', or whether they underwrite a collective enterprise to rise 'together', we examine their efforts to curb Washington's 'exorbitant privilege' and to frame a joint response to the climate crisis. We conclude with a discussion of the policy choices that will decide whether the BRICS will enter the geopolitical hall of fame or end in the dustbins of history.
Associational dynamics: An analytical framework
Unlike the BRICs economic promise, their political pedigree rarely makes headlines. Yet a decade ago, Jim O'Neil did not just bet on the next big investment opportunity. When others tried to make sense of 9/11, the British banker urged Western leaders to 'upgrade' the G7 to allow for 'more effective global [economic] policymaking ' (O'Neill 2001) . His case for reform was simple enough: The G7 could not afford to ignore the main engines of global growth forever, and even if the EU were to reduce its multilateral footprint, a revamped G7 posed no threat to the international status quo. Despite their revisionist instincts, the four 'original' BRICs were, after all, a motley bunch with little in common but their size, growth prospects and mutual animosities.
While the BRICs took the markets by storm, the G7 stayed put. When, in 2007, Goldman
Sachs advised giddy investors to look beyond the then obvious (GS 2007) , the G7 summoned the 'outreach five' -Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Mexico -to discuss intellectual property rights, investment climates, 'joint responsibilities for development' and measures to curb carbon emissions, all on G7 terms. BRIC diplomats played along, but decided that they deserved better.
At a first formal meeting at the margins of the 62 nd session of the UN General Assembly, the four foreign ministers announced that their ambassadors to UN cities would henceforth 'meet on a regular basis to examine the main issues of the international agenda' and brief deputy foreign ministers on 'possible agreements on specific areas of ... interaction' which foreign ministers would then discuss. 3 Since then, the BRICS have become a fixture on the diplomatic parquet.
According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the addition of South Africa, the 'leading African country', has also given the unlikely alignment 'a truly global dimension.' 4
From BRICs to BRICS: The emergence of an unlikely alignment
Political scientists rarely bother with bankers' visions. Nevertheless, the BRICs attracted academic attention even before they took on a political persona. Predictably, much of the early literature sought to reassert the primacy of political analysis. On the eve of the global financial crisis, political scientists either dismissed the BRICs as a 'mirage' (Armijo 2007:40) instance, that whereas Moscow jumped on the BRIC band wagon to regain some lustre, and to balance China's rise (Roberts 2010) , China ducked behind its accidental allies to recast its efforts to stabilize its international environment as a collective reformist rather than individual revisionist enterprise (Glosny 2010) . In stark contrast with Beijing's preoccupation with 'China threat' scenarios (Deng 2008) , Delhi used its BRIC cachet to exact the international respect it thought it deserved (Sinha and Dorschner 2010) . And though joining the BRICs complicated Brasilia's bid for global environmental leadership (Sotero and Armijo 2007) , the stark contrast with the more assertive and nuclear 'big three' bolstered its 'soft power' credentials (Roberts 2010) . South Africa rushed under the BRICS umbrella to compensate for the fading veneer of the Rainbow nation, and entrench its claim for continental leadership (Cooper 2011) .
A second line of research is probing the BRICS' revisionist instincts, posture and capabilities. Although most analysts concur that so far, 'China and the BRICS' have done more to reinforce than to subvert the liberal order (Glosny 2010) , many worry that none 'accede to a Western-centric order' or 'view themselves as beneficiaries of the liberal international system' (Cooper and Alexandroff 2010) . Others note that although the BRIC(S) combine considerable assets and ambitions, they lack the strategic posture and depth to challenge U.S. leadership or entrench a new world order (Cohen et al. 2010, Hart and Jones 2010) . Some believe that the BRICS' 'emerging market' potential has been exaggerated, and that they are more likely to end in the middle income trap than on the great power pedestal.
Conceptualizing associational dynamics: Two propositions
Associational dynamics are of course a staple in the 'metaphors, myths and models' IR scholarship has deployed to demystify the balance of power that overshadows the politics among nations (Little 2007) . Generations of realists and their critics have debated the alchemy of alliance formation, or drawn up taxonomies to distinguish alignments on the basis of their resilience to in-group or intergroup strains and challengers. We put ourselves to a more modest task: we observe that in the context of multilateral negotiations, states enter bargaining coalitions to shorten the odds on their preferred outcomes (Dupont 1996) . They may, and often do, leave it at that. But for a variety of reasons, some of which we discuss in more detail below, states sometimes develop ad hoc coalitions into more cohesive negotiating blocs, such as the Like
Minded Group that fought to curb the WTO's reach and remit (Narlikar and Odell 2006) .
Occasionally, states form partnerships that play across multilateral venues, along the lines of the G7, whose 'steering club ethos' helped redefine the liberal order after the demise of the Bretton Woods system (Cooper and Alexandroff 2010:5) . A select few join fraternities, such as the North Atlantic security community, which played a key role in creating 'the West' as we know it (Deutsch et al. 1957) . In the following, we develop two propositions that frame the BRICS reach and resilience in function of the coalition/community divide that cuts across this broader associational spectrum, Proposition 1: A coalition to rise in tandem. States typically pool power and/or resources in bargaining coalitions to win negotiations or to gain leverage over parties outside their coalition (Hampson 1995) . In theory, it makes little difference whether the members of these 'deliberately constructed' networks share the same interests, values, priorities or goals, as long as they agree on 'general or limited common objectives' (Dupont 1996) . In practice, not every coalition works, and not every working coalition works for each member. Empirical studies show that a coalition's impact and longevity depend both on the elasticity of its internal hierarchy and ideology and on its collective ability to amass 'critical' weight (Narlikar 2003) . To be effective, coalitions must be able to capitalize on their members' diversity and play off individual weaknesses and strengths to direct, deviate or derail negotiations. To survive, coalition members must be flexible enough to minimize intra-coalitional frictions and to react to potentially destabilizing counterstrategies.
Clearly, coalition success also depends on members' commitment. From a rationalist perspective, the value of a coalition is determined by the premium joint negotiation payoffs add to the individual payoffs coalition members could expect by going it alone. Consequently, a coalition is deemed stable if and as long as its members perceive it not merely as an efficient tool to achieve their preferred outcome, but as an effective means to increase their share of net benefits, either by increasing bargaining gains or by lowering bargaining costs. Faced with the permanent risk of defection and coalition breakdown, a state's decision to bet on a coalition thus hinges on the perceived likelihood that other coalition members have priced the cost of sustaining a joint endeavour into their 'best alternative to negotiated agreement' (Fisher et al. 1991) . One problem is that the individual costs of sustaining a 'winning' or a 'blocking' coalition are hard to gauge, both in any particular and -even more so -across different multilateral negotiations. Numerous countries have therefore established value or identity-based groupings, whose members discount participation costs against the promise of substantial cohesion benefits (Narlikar 2001) .
The common denominator of the different types of bargaining coalitions is that they serve self-interested actors who consider identity -or diversity -either as an obstacle or an opportunity to achieve a given objective. No matter how far coalitions move from their default ad hoc 'interest' position towards 'bloc-type' cohesion, members' give and take with allies and opponents remains predicated on the lack of better alternative arrangements. collective identities' that transform coalitions into 'imagined' communities (Adler 1997:258) . To make this happen, states must re-invest part of their cooperation gains in the creation of a 'friendly' environment and shared institutions that can foster 'mutual trust and responsiveness'.
More importantly, the putative members of an 'imagined' community must be prepared to include each other in their decision-making processes, to revisit criteria to distinguish friends and foes, to embark in collective enterprises and to address common challenges on the basis of a shared normative discourse (Adler and Barnett 1998:53) .
So far, IR has focused mainly on the ascendancy of 'imagined' communities in regional organizations and collective security arrangements. There is, however, no compelling reason to consider geography a natural adhesive, or to assume that collective security is the only goal that can mould the expectation of 'diffuse reciprocity' into an inspiration for international solidarity.
As Benedict Anderson's pioneering study on the 'imagined' nation points out, there are no 'genuine' images that sustain particular communities, only different styles of imagination (Anderson 1991:5-7) . If imagined affinity, rather than observable proximity or similarity unlocks collective destiny, it follows that the political prowess of a political grouping like the BRICS depends neither on shared attributes nor on common aspirations, but on its members' inclination to imagine and define their association either in 'particularistic' terms, i.e. as a kinship network of sorts, or as an expression of a 'deep horizontal comradeship'.
Although states enter coalitions and communities for strategic reasons, bonded communities differ from calculation-bound coalitions to the extent to which they put their common destiny ahead of individual advantage. Tactics of course still matter, and the 'postcolonial' kinship of the G77 is less likely than the 'true comradeship' of OPEC to inspire quarrelling members to figuratively 'die' for the idea of their communion. Indeed, the point here is not that communities always cooperate across all issues, but that in cross-issue and multiple fora negotiations, partnerships and fraternities are more resilient, and possibly more effective than tactical coalitions. Whereas errant kin or straying brethren are typically welcomed back into the communal fold, at the coalitional end of the associational scale contenders are often able to capitalise on disagreements, incite defections and break up alignments. Whereas factious coalitions often neutralise their strengths, fraternities typically sacrifice the blameless to renew the communal bond (Girard 1979 ).
Methods and case selection
To assess whether the BRICS template 'merely' helps opportunistic coalition partners to paper over strategic rivalries and distrust, or whether it has the power to reconcile its long estranged members, we examine the behaviour and conduct of issue leaders and key stakeholders in two controversial domains that have been high on the BRICS agenda: financial stability and climate diplomacy. In both cases, individual ambitions chafe against collective aspirations, testing both BRICS cohesion and sense of direction. However, whereas efforts to curb Washington's 'exorbitant privilege' peg the grouping's revisionist resolve, the struggle for a response to the climate crisis probes their post-hegemonic potential.
To set the analytical stage for the case studies, we rely on the conceptual maps Adler and Barnett provide to study the emergence of security communities in response to 'precipitating factors' which encourage states to coordinate their policies, 'structural elements' which govern their transactions and engagements, and institutional 'processes' which contribute to the development of trust and collective identity formation. However, while we agree that international communities are path-dependent, we are less confident that they 'exhibit an evolutionary pattern that follows the "arrow of time"' (Adler and Barnett 1998:49) . Hence, instead of tracing the BRICS' progress from an ad hoc coalition to a nascent, an ascendant and a mature community, we use coalitions and communities as ideal types, outlined in Table 1 , whose distinct renditions of typical behaviour and conduct allow us to chart how individual BRICS countries adjust their strategic objectives and policy priorities in a continuous re-appraisal of the relative merits of pluralist coalitional opportunities and solidarist communal obligations. To distinguish coalitions from communities, we adopt an analytic two step. In a first move, we examine how issue leaders define coalition profiles and how coalition partners position themselves to bolster their bargaining position. We derive our profile features from Narlikar's taxonomy of 'system challenging' and 'system conforming' types of negotiation behaviour, which posits that 'hard revisionist' coalitions form blocs to pursue distributive strategies aimed at equitable or fair outcomes at the margins of established multilateral venues, whereas 'softly reformist' coalitions confide in issue-based networks and integrative strategies to improve the efficiency and efficacy of existing multilateral processes (Narlikar 2010) . To test cohesion, we identify behaviour that discounts coalition gains or highlights hedges against defection.
In a second step, we examine BRICS investments in a friendly environment, focusing on the cues they take from shared norms and narratives when they forego cooperation gains and forgive or forget others' transgressions. Since multilateral diplomacy has honed the art of rallying behind supposedly common heritages or objectives, the community dimension is, by its nature, elusive. Governments are typically aware that their ability to capitalize on a communal bond depends on the community's cachet, and that they have to show that they are willing to make some sacrifices in the name of cohesion. Moreover, just like protestations of undying commitments can be fronts for opportunistic bargains, estrangements may be temporary, and reflect a reluctant response to insufficient community heft, rather than waning affections. To gauge the BRICS' willingness to metaphorically 'die for each other' we therefore distinguish between the calculated bargaining behaviour that determines coalitional dynamics and the conduct that informs their image of political communion. In short, to deconstruct the distinct associational practices, we observe not just what the BRICS do and aim for, but how they position themselves along the coalition/community divide.
3. The global financial crisis, Washington's exorbitant privilege and the battle over
IMF surveillance
The global financial crisis did not merely crush hopes for easy prosperity, overleveraged bank balance sheets or public finances. It also shattered the developing world's confidence in Indeed, since the developing world's total reserve holdings more than doubled between 2006 and 2011, the 'emerging' rest actually raised their subsidies to the U.S. from $820bn to -at least -$1.5tn at current prices. As a deputy governor at the Bank of Russia wryly observed in late 2011, a lack of liquid alternatives meant that there were simply no 'good' opportunities to diversify reserves from dollar denominated instruments. Figure 2 , rattled all save China, which loosened but did not lift its controversial currency peg. Brazil had to resort to 'unconventional measures' to stem the inflow of 'hot' money that was pushing up the real. India, meanwhile, struggled to tame inflation, which it blamed in part on the liquidity-driven surge in commodity prices. Whereas a weakening rand wrecked South Africa's balance of payments, the weak rouble bolstered Russia's export earnings.
Once again, the U.S currency had become the world's problem. Although no other BRICS government official went to the Russian prime minister's rhetoric extremes, they concurred that
Washington had been 'living like a parasite ... off the monopoly of the dollar' for too long. reform of the international financial system, and was prepared to back the G20 as a 'decisionmaking and management mechanism that will … reflect, in particular, the interests of emerging markets and developing countries'. To prevent a relapse into a G7+ routine, Hu also insisted on 'enhancing' the IFI's ability 'to fulfil their responsibilities' and reiterated that the IMF should oversee the 'major international financial centres' and help 'improve the international currency system by steadily promoting its diversification' (Hu 2008) .
Despite the looming crisis, China's endorsement of the G20 was a setback for those who had hoped for a concerted 'global' response to the 'American-made' meltdown. For many, the call to strengthen the IMF added insult to injury. Memories of harsh adjustments were still fresh, and even the Fund's advocates admitted that its harsh prescriptions had prompted many emerging economies to build up the 'excessive' reserves that had fuelled the creation of the ever more quixotic dollar instruments that had precipitated the crisis in the first place. At a diplomatic level, moreover, the BRICS had little to lose. Their efforts to strengthen the IMF could either flounder and expose western obstinacy, or succeed and entrench them more firmly in one of the prime sites of global economic governance. The resulting 'hard reformist' posture committed coalition members to work within the preeminent multilateral frameworks to overhaul an establishment institution, only to make it perform in a more even-handed manner.
There was, however, a major complication. For Beijing, the Fund also represented an important line of defence against U.S. attacks on its currency peg. Brazil also trade at a hefty 4% discount to their quotas, compared to an EU average of 3%. More importantly, though, the BRIC consultations and exchanges that lead to the U-turn on surveillance did little to defuse the emerging world's dollar reserve predicament. BASIC cooperation at the conference was a result of India and China's efforts to consolidate their positions in order to resist pressure to commit to legally binding targets, and Brazil and South Africa joined. BASIC increased these countries' bargaining power: before the conference they agreed to collectively exit if developed nations tried to force their own terms. However, BASIC cooperated with the US to drive the negotiations to its desired outcome. diverge in their approaches to the problem, which is a major barrier to coalitional cohesion.
Instead of operating through BRICS, emerging powers use BASIC coalition to improve members' bargaining position in international hierarchies, and display communitarian orientation in their approach. BASIC is useful for identifying shared opportunity and threat perceptions and the evolution of shared norms and narratives given these economies' changing status from victims to polluters. In practice, it allows countries to engage in policy experimentation and review of developed country policies. While it can be argued that BRICS is trying to articulate principles for renewable energy cooperation, its collective aspirations to revise climate change negotiations and assume a major global policy-making role are modest, and the evolution of community behaviour in this realm is unlikely.
Conclusions: Turning BRICS into a community
Academic scholarship and policymakers have been divided on the nature and prospects of the BRICS. This study has added new insights by charting the associational dynamics of BRICS membership along a coalition/community divide. It analysed BRICS behaviour is in two contentious areas of global governance: financial stability and climate change.
The currency case suggests that shared concerns about the U.S. stewardship of the global economy, and an awareness of the collaborative efforts needed to establish a more developmental international reserve system can produce shared narratives and inspire effective bargaining coalitions. However, while China's strategic use of its BRICS affiliation helped it to overturn the IMF's 2007 surveillance decision, disagreements about the urgency of strengthening the reserve role of the yuan reveal cracks in the burgeoning BRICS brotherhood. Russian balancing, Brazilian alarmism and China's reluctance to make sacrifices to socialise the benefits of its regained room for manoeuvre cast doubt over Beijing's ability to play on a sense of community to maintain coalition cohesion in less defensive endeavours.
In the climate case, the BRICS aspired to collectively address the climate threat and to ensure that climate change does not derail their rapid development, but they never managed to operate as a bargaining coalition. The main obstacle to a BRICS climate bloc was the different approach the BASIC group and Russia took to addressing climate change and in particular to revising the Kyoto Protocol. By intensifying and deepening cooperation, BASIC members managed to exert greater policy influence than they would have had individually, but they also deepened the divisions and distributive dynamics between the BASIC and Russia.
From a policy perspective, there are nevertheless clear silver linings. At the currency front, the BRICS retain their ability to shape the reform of the global financial system. However, if they want to play a transformative role, governments would have agree on a blueprint for change that, unlike the PBOC's previous plans, includes a realistic timetable for the internationalization of the RMB, a commitment to controversial domestic reforms and, perhaps most importantly, clear sense of the division of roles, and labour. BRICS countries also have the potential to use their coalition strategically to address climate change if they find a way to bridge the gap between BRICS and BASIC. While this is difficult in climate negotiations, which are focused on distributing responsibilities for emissions, Russia and BASIC can shift the climate debate by developing a shared narrative around access to clean energy services and technologies, and they can pursue mutual gains from renewable energy cooperation. To conclude, our study suggests that although the BRICS' pursuit of compatible revisionist goals can inspire coalitional cohesion for soft reformist targets, the prospects for community building remain elusive. If revisionist goals are absent, the BRICS struggle to operate as a coalition, their rhetoric notwithstanding.
Nevertheless, the BRICS can still make the leap of faith needed to transform an illusory into an imagined community. They even have a choice: they can either embark on an Anderson-inspired communal trajectory and exploit a shared temporal dimension and a common developmental momentum to build a multipolar order. Or they can get their act together, align behind a responsible leader, and exploit the West's relative decline to drive a hard coalition bargain. Yet if they end up doing neither, they -and perhaps the developing world at large -will soon lament the early demise of another promising attempt to globalise the international order.
